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We study the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance program as a bellwether for designs of private,
non-mandatory health insurance markets that control adverse selection and assure adequate access
and coverage.  We model Part D enrollment and plan choice assuming a discrete dynamic decision
process that maximizes life-cycle expected utility, and perform counterfactual policy simulations of
the effect of market design on participation and plan viability.  Our model correctly predicts high Part
D enrollment rates among the currently healthy, but also strong adverse selection in choice of level
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REGULATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS
Lessons from enrollment, plan type choice, and adverse selection in Medicare Part D
1  Introduction 
Health-care systems with mandated health insurance financed from some combination of
consumer, employer, and government sources is standard in all developed countries except the
United States, where about 18 percent of the non-elderly population is currently uninsured (Gruber,
2008), and many of the insured face financially risky gaps in coverage.  The health cost of
incomplete coverage is substantial:  In comparison with other countries, the United States ranks 25
th
in the survival rate from age 15 to age 60, which impacts the population of workers and young
parents whose loss is a substantial cost to families and to the economy.
1  If the U.S. could raise its
survival rate for this group to that of Switzerland, a country that has mandatory standardized
coverage offered by private insurers, this would prevent more than 190,000 deaths per year.  The
elderly in the United States aged 65+ do have universal coverage under the Medicare program, with
prescription drug coverage (Medicare Part D) added in 2006.  This may explain the somewhat better
comparative performance of the United States for seniors, a rank of 14
th in life expectancy at age 65.
Since the U.S. has a population that at retirement has the poorest health in the developed world, this
is a medical accomplishment, but it is very costly – U.S. health expenditures per capita are 50
percent higher than those in any other country.
An important question for health policy in the U.S. is whether starting from the current private
markets for health insurance and services and honoring the entitlements of current stakeholders and
freedom of choice for consumers, it is possible to achieve essentially universal health insurance
coverage at feasible levels of government involvement and total cost.  If so, what are the
mechanisms for regulation and subsidy that could accomplish this?  Some lessons can be drawn
from the Medicare Part D program, which provides the Medicare-eligible population with universal
access to a subsidized market for non-mandatory standardized prescription drug coverage through
government-approved contracts sponsored by private insurance firms; see Bach and McClellan2 In the first year of Medicare Part D, more than 90% of the eligible population obtained prescription drug
coverage, either from a Medicare Part D plan or a source with comparable coverage (Heiss-McFadden-Winter,
2006).
3Union and employer-provided retiree plans that are coordinated with Part D, and Medicare Advantage
plans that bundle drug coverage with other medical services in an HMO-like setting, are not subject to the same
selection pressures, and continue to offer a variety of coverage levels.  However, health insurance provided under
such plans is dropping in the working population, and individual policies for prescription drugs will become more
important in the future.
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(2005).  This new market is representative of a trend toward “consumer-directed healthcare” that
relies on consumer behavior and competition among insurance firms to attain satisfactory allocation
of health care resources with limited government regulation, and is one model for more
comprehensive reform of health care insurance (see Newhouse, 2004; Buntin et al., 2006; Goodman,
2006; and the references therein). 
Overall, Medicare Part D is considered a success story:  Despite a rocky start, enrollment rates
are high
2, consumers have a broad choice of sponsors, and premiums are lower than anticipated by
policymakers and sponsors (Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 2006, 2007; Goldman and Joyce, 2008;
Duggan, Healy, and Scott Morton, 2008).  However, as we show in this paper, variety in available
levels of coverage has diminished sharply for individual buyers in the first three years of operation
of the Part D market.  Offerings of plans with the most comprehensive coverage have collapsed, and
plans with intermediate coverage are at risk of a death spiral of rising premiums and falling
enrollment, a phenomenon predicted for this market by Pauly and Zeng (2004) as a consequence of
adverse selection, and observed in other health insurance markets; see Cutler and Reber (1998)
3. 
This paper examines the success of the Part D market, and the lessons that can be drawn from
it on the broader questions of how to organize and regulate private health insurance markets.  We
present a structural model of insurance enrollment and plan type choice of a rational, forward-
looking consumer in a stylized environment with uncertain future health outcomes. We include key
features of the Medicare Part D program: a late-enrollment penalty, a coverage gap, government
subsidies, and risk adjustment (see section 3.1 for a discussion of these institutional features of the
Medicare Part D market).  We calibrate the resulting discrete dynamic decision process with
transition probabilities for the state variables (survival, health status, and prescription drug
expenditure) estimated from Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) data using a dynamic-3-
model of health and drug use based on Heiss (2009).  Our model correctly predicts high enrollment
rates among the currently healthy, and strong adverse selection in choice between standard and
extended benefit plans.  We also simulate counterfactual scenarios that manipulate the key
institutional features of the Medicare Part D market mentioned above, and examine the
consequences for access, coverage, and market viability. 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that develops a structural intertemporal model for health
insurance decisions that allows for plan types with varying generosity.  Most closely related to our
analysis of demand in a market modeled after Medicare Part D is a paper by Yang et al. (2009), who
analyze the choice of supplemental health insurance among Medicare beneficiaries, their medical
care demand, and subsequent health outcomes. With respect to the modeling approach, a paper
related to our work is Gilleskie (1998), who analyzes the decisions to visit a doctor and/or to miss
work during an episode of acute illness as the sequential choices of individuals solving a discrete
choice stochastic dynamic programming problem. 
Section 2 of this paper discusses the effect of selection in health insurance markets, and the roles
that subsidies and coverage requirements can play.  Section 3 describes the new Medicare Part D
prescription drug program,  reviews the existing literature on its operation, and gives summary
statistics on supply and demand for Part D plans with different levels of coverage.  In Section 4, we
introduce a discrete dynamic decision model of enrollment and plan choice in Medicare Part D.
Section 5 contains our estimation and simulation results.  In Section 6, we summarize our findings,
draw policy conclusions, and discuss avenues for future research.
2  Selection and Health Insurance
Heterogeneity in consumer tastes and needs, and in cost and quality of products, are ubiquitous
features of resource allocation.  When heterogeneities are publically observable, markets can price,
sort, and match these variations efficiently, and product choices made by consumers yield demand
signals that foster efficient resource allocation.  For example, in a competitive insurance market
where neither buyers or sellers have private information that they can use to “cherry pick” or “lemon
drop” contracts, competitive underwriting which prices insurance contracts on their actuarial value
will attract all sufficiently risk-adverse consumers and achieve market efficiency.  An essential4For example, insurers may be required to exclude race, gender, or pre-existing conditions from
determination of premiums or screening of enrollees, or to include no-cancellation clauses in their policies.
5  People in poor health may be more tolerant of risk not because they are more risk-adverse, but rather
because losses have less life-cycle impact.  When mortality risk is high, there is less likelihood of suffering
continuing correlated losses and restricted consumption into the future, and hence less need to protect assets. 
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insurance aspect of these contracts will be  inclusion of clauses that limit the ability of the insurer
to reprice policies, or restrict or cancel coverage, as a result of subsequent buyer experience.  In an
efficient market, these clauses will be offered and priced as part of the competitive underwriting
process. 
Now consider an alternative situation in which consumers have private information on the risks
they face, or insurers are restrained from competitive underwriting based on some of the information
they can collect on consumers.
4  Then, there may be a gap between the consumer’s perceived
expected benefits from an insurance contract, and the premium this consumer faces.  If consumers
recognize and respond to such gaps by switching away from contracts perceived to be unfair, the
result is classical adverse selection, which Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show
can induce costly and inefficient screening, and market unraveling in which many less risky
consumers are unable to obtain insurance at premiums that reflect their expected benefits.  
Healthy people appear to be more risk adverse than sick people, and this can offset some of the
effects of adverse selection; see Buchmueller et al (2008), Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2006),
Finkelstein and McGarry (2003), De Donder and Hindriks (2006), and Cutler, Finkelstein, and
McGarry (2008).
5  However, the demonstrable evidence is that current health insurance markets in
the U.S. are severely impacted by adverse selection despite this offset – premiums for individuals
are much higher than premiums for employee groups where automatic enrollment eliminates
selection effects, and many individuals are denied coverage, particularly for pre-existing conditions.
Control of adverse selection through the organization and regulation of health insurance markets
then has to be a critical component of initiatives to reform and expand the current private health
insurance system.  The market for Medicare Part D contracts is potentially affected by all the
selection problems induced by asymmetric information among consumers, providers, and third-party
insurers in health insurance markets (for a comprehensive review, see Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000).6U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2006, Annual Social and Economic Supplement.
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A number of measures to control adverse selection have been incorporated in the Part D market, and
our analysis and simulations will evaluate the effectiveness of these and alternative mechanisms.
3 The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Program 
3.1.  Medicare Part D.  Before 2006, roughly 25 percent of the U.S. elderly population (age 65
and above) had little or no insurance coverage for their prescription drugs, and 10 percent had
annual pharmacy bills exceeding $5600 (Winter et al., 2006).  Median per capita income in this
population was $15,700 in 2005, and 29 percent of this population had incomes below $10,000.
6
Uninsured prescription drug costs were thus a heavy burden on unhealthy elderly.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) within the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services administer health insurance coverage for older Americans via the Medicare
program.  The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) was enacted to extend coverage for
prescription drugs to the Medicare population.  Beginning in 2006, the new Medicare Part D benefit
reduced the financial burden of prescription drug spending for beneficiaries, especially those with
low incomes or extraordinarily high (“catastrophic”) out-of-pocket drug expenses.  CMS administers
this program, subsidizing outpatient prescription drug coverage offered by private sponsors of drug
plans that give beneficiaries access to a standard prescription drug benefit.  In the following, we
describe those features of Medicare Part D that are relevant for our subsequent analysis of consumer
behavior in this market.  More details on the Medicare part D prescription drug benefit can be found
on the CMS website and in Bach and McClellan (2005).
A number of mechanisms to mitigate adverse selection and assure broad access have been
incorporated in the design of the Medicare Part D market.  Every insurer in the market must offer
a “Standard plan” designed by Medicare that has tightly controlled features and is available to all
Medicare-eligible individuals in a geographical area at the same premium.  Insurers may offer plans
that are actuarially equivalent to the standard plan, and plans with added coverage, but offerings
must be approved by Medicare, and the number and features of alternative contracts are regulated
to avoid proliferation of plan types.  All plans must be open to all eligible consumers.  There is an
annual open enrollment period, and consumers are free to switch insurers and plan types each year.-6-
Sponsor’s formularies must cover designated therapeutic categories, and some drugs are “protected”
and must appear in every formulary.  One important feature is a penalty for late enrollment.
Individuals who failed to enroll in Part D when they first became eligible (upon enrollment in
Medicare A or B), or by the end of the initial enrollment period (May 15, 2006) if that came later,
and did not have creditable coverage from another source, faced a late enrollment penalty fee of 1%
a month for every month that they waited to join.  The penalty is computed based on the average
monthly premium of Part D standard plans in a given year.  As the analysis of an intertemporal
discrete choice model by Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2007) shows, the late-enrollment penalty
provides a strong monetary incentive for consumers to enroll when they first become eligible, rather
than wait to join after health problems develop and drug costs rise.  This alleviates adverse selection
by encouraging the healthy to enroll.   
Critical parameters in determining Standard plan benefits are the plan formulary, the
beneficiary’s annual pharmacy bill for drugs in the plan formulary, the beneficiary’s true out-of-
pocket (TrOOP) payments for these covered drugs and threshold for catastrophic coverage, and the
average monthly premium.  In the benefits formula, expenditures for drugs not in the plan formulary
are not counted in the pharmacy bill or in TrOOP payments.  Part D premiums are also excluded
from TrOOP payments.  The Standard Medicare Part D plan had the following benefit schedule in
2006 (standard plan coverage in later years has the same structure, with annual adjustments for
inflation in drug prices):  The beneficiary had an annual pharmacy bill deductible of $250, and a
copayment of 25% of drug costs above $250 and up to $2,250.  The TrOOP payment is then $750
for a beneficiary whose pharmacy bill has reached $2,250.  The beneficiary paid 100% of drug costs
above $2,250 and up to a TrOOP threshold of $3,600; this is referred to as the coverage gap or
doughnut hole.  The TrOOP threshold of $3,600 was attained at a drug bill of $5,100.  The
beneficiary had a copayment of 5% of drug costs above the drug bill threshold of $5,100 where the
TrOOP threshold level was achieved; this is referred to as catastrophic coverage.  Monthly
premiums varied with plan sponsor and area, and were publically available to consumers at the CMS
Part D website, along with a national average premium determined by CMS.
Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2007) provide a calculation of the actuarial value of Standard
plan benefits, based on a projection by CMS in 2005, the year prior to the introduction of Part D,
of the distribution of 2006 drug costs for the full Medicare-eligible population.  The 2006 expected-7-
drug cost in this population was $245.03 per month.  If enrollment in the Part D Standard plan had
been universal, the expected benefit would have been $128.02 per month, or $91.13 net of the
monthly average premium of $36.90 anticipated in 2005, and the expected TrOOP cost would have
been $117.01 per month. TrOOP plus premium then represented 62.8% of expected drug cost.
Expressed as shares of total expected benefits, reinsurance was at 29.9% and the total subsidy was
at 84.2% (corresponding to 74.5% of total expected benefits plus administrative costs).  The actual
monthly average premium of $32.20 in 2006 was lower than anticipated; this may have been the
result of lower drug costs arising from pharmacy benefit management and drug price negotiations
by sponsors.
Medicare Part D plans sponsored by private insurance firms may differ from the Standard plan
in their premiums and other plan features, provided that their benefits for any drug bill are on
average at least as high as those of the Standard plan; see Bach and McClellan (2006, p. 2313).
“Actuarially Equivalent” plans have copayment tiers rather than a copayment percentage, while
“Basic Alternative” plans have copayment tiers and no deductible.  “Enhanced plans” may include
gap coverage for generic drugs, or for all formulary drugs.  Duggan, Healy, and Scott Morton (2008)
describe the Part D market using this CMS classification of plan types.  In this paper, we use a
somewhat different classification of plans into three types that emphasize differences in level of
coverage.  Mimicking the terminology of some sponsors, we name these Silver, Gold, and Platinum
types.  Silver plans include the Medicare-specified Standard plan, and alternatives that are
actuarially equivalent and vary only in copayment structure and/or handling of an initial deductible.
Our Silver plan benefit schedule (in 2006 prices) is BS(D) = 0.75@max(0,min(D-$250,$2000)) +
0.95@max(D-DS,0), where D is the annual drug bill at the pharmacy, and DS = $5100 is the Silver
threshold for catastrophic coverage, determined by the drug bill at which the enrollee’s TrOOP
reaches $3600.  This is the actual Standard plan benefit schedule, and is a good characterization of
benefits for all plans in the Silver class.  A key characteristic of Silver plans is that they offer no
benefits for drug costs in the gap $2250 < D < TS.  
The Platinum class offering the broadest coverage is assumed to eliminate the deductible and
provide a 75 percent benefit on all formulary drug costs up to an annual drug bill of DP = $14,400,
the threshold where the enrollee’s TrOOP reaches $3600 and 95 percent catastrophic coverage starts.
The corresponding benefit schedule is BP(D) = 0.75@min(D,DP) + 0.95@max(D-DP,0).  This is a good-8-
characterization of the class of “enhanced” plans with gap coverage for all formulary drugs.  The
Gold class offering an intermediate level of coverage is assumed to eliminate the deductible and
provide a 30 percent benefit on drug costs through the gap, with the benefit schedule BG(D) =
0.75@min(D,$2250) + 0.3@max(min(D,DG)-$2250,0) + 0.95@max(D-DG,0), where DG = $6589 is the
drug bill threshold where the enrollee’s TrOOP reaches $3600 and catastrophic coverage starts.  Our
Gold plan benefit schedule is chosen to approximate extended plans that cover 75 percent of the cost
of generic drugs in the gap, but do not cover brand-name drugs.  Generic drugs constitute roughly
40 percent of drug costs when drug bills are between $2250 and $6600, leading to the 30 = 0.75@40
percent benefit that we assume in the gap for Gold plans.  In actuality, there is variation across
sponsors in generic formularies, and variation across consumers in needs for brand-name drugs.  As
a result, the actual benefits to individuals under plans offering gap coverage for generics can vary
considerably.  In addition, individuals taking generic gap coverage have a strong incentive to use
generic substitutes where possible.  Thus, selection effects within the Gold class may be important.
We will abstract from this level of detail for study of consumer choice among plan types, and take
BG(D) as a reasonable stylized representation of Gold class benefits.  Figure 1 graphs the benefit
schedules for the Silver, Gold, and Platinum plans.  One feature that will figure in plan type choice
is that enrollees in enhanced plans must reach higher drug bills than Silver plan enrollees before they
reach the TrOOP thresholds beyond which their copayments drop to 5 percent of their drug costs.
Thus, at very high drug bills, the extra benefit from a Gold or Platinum plan rather than a Silver plan
is largely dissipated.
The mechanism used by CMS to subsidize Part D plan sponsors determines the premiums for
the Standard plan, and affects the cost to sponsors of offering enhanced plans.  Key features of the
mechanism are established in the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act
(MMA) of 2003.  Detailed descriptions of the mechanism are given in CBO (2004), CMS (2005),
Medpac (2006), Simon and Lucarelli (2006), and Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2007).  Basically,
the CMS subsidy of plan sponsors has two components, a direct subsidy, paid prospectively, and
reinsurance of 80 percent of catastrophic benefits, paid retrospectively.  The prospective payments
include risk adjustments for the sponsor’s enrollee mix that are intended to neutralize adverse
selection, and premium subsidies for qualified low-income enrollees.  A key feature of the subsidy
mechanism is that sponsors submit bids annually to CMS for their anticipated costs of providing-9-
standard plan benefits to a representative Part D enrollee, including administrative costs and return
on capital, but excluding reinsurance of catastrophic benefits.  CMS then processes these bids to
produce a national base premium that covers 25.5 percent of the prospective national average total
benefits and administrative cost of a representative Part D enrollee (including reinsurance cost), and
an associated base direct subsidy equal to the national average bid less the base premium.  Premiums
for individual plans are then set to the plan’s bid less the base direct subsidy.  As a consequence,
each plan has a premium that when added to the base direct subsidy equals the plan’s bid, and the
plan bid determines its premium.  The principle behind the Part D market design is that competition
for enrollees should limit the ability of plan sponsors to profit from increasing their bids, encourage
cost-saving, and drive bids toward actual long-run cost.  The high overall market subsidy of 74.5
percent of benefit and administrative cost is designed to keep premiums low and induce nearly
universal enrollment.  
The subsidies described above also apply to enrollees in enhanced plans, and thus appear to be
neutral with respect to plan type choice.  However, two factors affect the expected benefit cost of
enhanced plan enrollees, and the viability of enhanced plans in the market.  First, the delays in
reaching the thresholds for catastrophic coverage in enhanced plans affect their profitability for
sponsors.  Under the Gold Plan, the sponsor must cover 30 percent of incremental drug costs
between DS and DG, and under the Platinum Plan, the sponsor must cover 75 percent of incremental
drug costs between DS and DP, while if the same enrollee were on the Silver plan, the sponsor would
have to cover only 15 percent of incremental drug costs, due to reinsurance.  These are reductions
in the Medicare subsidy for enrollees in enhanced plans relative to the Silver plan, effectively a net
tax that sponsors will pass on to enrollees in higher enhanced plan premiums.  However, some
enhanced plans qualify for a Medicare demonstration that capitates catastrophic reinsurance to levels
that are expected for Standard plan enrollees in a given risk class.  This has the effect of reversing
the net tax, with sponsors now collecting 25 percent copayments, but liable for only 20 percent of
incremental drug costs due to reinsurance, for incremental drug bills between the thresholds.
Capitation of reinsurance does have the drawback of giving a sponsor a strong incentive to use its
formulary and step therapies to suppress drug use by high-need enrollees, since in the catastrophic
region it is at the short-run margin liable for 95 percent of incremental benefit costs.  We will
assume in our simulations that the demonstration subsidy program applies to enhanced plans, so that-10-
in effect the sponsor is relieved of liability for 80 percent of incremental drug costs above the Silver
plan threshold of $5100.
Second, the CMS risk adjustment of the direct subsidy, described by Robst, Levy, and Ingbas
(2007), begins with a regression equation that can be written schematically as B = γ + RxHCC@δ + DC@η +
g, where B is the Standard plan benefit cost, RxHCC is a hierarchical condition codes for health that are
related to drug use, DC is a vector of demographic characteristics, g is a disturbance, and γ, δ, η are
coefficients.  This model is estimated for a representative sample of the population of persons
enrolled in Medicare and eligible for Part D, with the dependent variable scaled so that it averages
to one in this population.  The risk factor for a sponsor is the average of B - 1 for its enrollees, using
fitted B’s from the regression, and its net risk adjustment payment per enrollee equals its bid times
its risk factor.  If the risk adjustment mechanism were perfectly predictive, it would completely
neutralize the impact of enrollee risk mix on sponsor benefit cost.  In practice, risk adjustment will
be only partial, due to classical regression to the mean.  Robst (2007) reports that the proportion of
variance explained by the regression is around 0.25, which means that there is considerable variation
in risks which is not accounted for.  In addition, the current Medicare procedure omits past year’s
drug bill as an explanatory variable, which if included raises the proportion of variance explained
to around 0.55.  Then,  sponsors of continuing enrollees can easily predict winners and losers whose
expected benefit cost variations are not removed by risk adjustment.  A potential adverse selection
problem is that sponsors may modify formularies and tiers using this information to reduce the cost
of enrollees who are losers; CMS plans to alter risk adjustment in the future to include past drug use
and remove this problem.  The effect of risk adjustment on the viability of plan types comes from
the fact that enhanced plans attract enrollees with more health problems and higher benefit costs.
Because risk adjustment addresses only the Standard plan component of benefits, it does not help
compensate sponsors for taking on increased expected benefit costs in the gap, and is not effective
in mitigating adverse selection in choice of enhanced plans.
3.2. Part D Demand and Supply, 2006-2009. To motivate our subsequent analysis, we present in
this section a few summary statistics on the dynamics of the market for Medicare Part D plans.
First, we consider the evolution of plan supply in this market.  Official CMS data allow us to classify
all Part D plans that have been offered from 2006 through 2009 into the Silver, Gold, and Platinum
types defined in Section 3.1 which correspond to the Medicare Standard Plan and equivalents, an7The enrollment statistics for active deciders utilize data from the Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS), a
national sample of Medicare Part D eligible individuals surveyed in four waves between 2005 and 2009 using an
internet panel format.  This panel may be affected by relatively small sample sizes, the questions used to elicit plan
choices and financial responsibility for premiums, and aging and losses from attrition and death over the life of the
panel; see Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2006, 2007, 2009).  In particular, the high share of Gold and Platinum
plans in 2007, and the uptick in the share of uninsured in 2009 may be sampling artifacts.
-11-
enhanced plan with gap coverage for generic drugs, and an enhanced plan with gap coverage for all
formulary drugs.  Table 1 shows that while the number of plans offered and average premium of
Silver plans have remained relatively stable, premiums for Gold plans have been rising sharply and
the number of these plans peaked in 2008.  The number of Platinum plans offered plummeted in
2007 to half the number offered in the previous year.  In 2008 and 2009 there very few plans
remaining in this class, and their premiums skyrocketed.  A plausible interpretation for these patterns
is that sponsors initially underestimated the average benefits paid in Gold and Platinum plans,
perhaps because they did not anticipate the full effects of adverse selection, and their subsequent
price adjustments toward break-even have been frustrated by further adverse selection.
Enrollment statistics given in panels B and C of Table 1 also show the downward spiral of
Platinum and Gold plans.  In the universe of persons eligible to enroll in Part D, including disabled
persons under age 65, the overall share enrolled in Platinum plans peaked in 2007 at 0.3 percent, and
these plans were not a factor in the market in 2008 and 2009.  The overall share enrolled in Gold
plans also peaked in 2007 at 3.1 percent, and by 2009 had declined to 2.6 percent.  Active deciders,
people aged 65+ who are not enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, an employer retiree plan, or
other plans such as FEHB or TRICARE that offer automatic drug insurance coverage, and who must
choose a stand-alone PDP or no insurance, constitute about 26 percent of the eligible age 65+
population.  In this group, the downward spiral appears to be more rapid.
7  In 2007, 31.7 percent of
active deciders choose a Gold plan, but by 2009 this share had dropped to 11.1 percent.  At the 2009
incremental premium of $41.40 for a Gold plan rather than a Silver plan, there is a relatively narrow
band of expected drug bills around the upper end of the gap at which the added benefits from a Gold
plan are actuarially favorable – bills below this range will not produce benefits that exceed the added
premiums, and bills above this range are unattractive because the delay in onset of low catastrophic
coverage copayment rates due to exclusion of the incremental premium from the TrOOP calculation
has the effect of recovering all additional Gold plan benefits from persons with very high drug bills.-12-
Thus, only people who have drug bills in this narrow range, or who are extremely risk averse or
mistaken in their perceptions, are likely to find Gold coverage attractive in the future.  It is possible
this group will be sufficient to sustain a small market for Gold plans, but these plans will not be
actuarially acceptable for the bulk of the elderly population.
Table 2 classifies Retirement Perspectives Survey respondents in 2006, 2007, and 2009 by
enrollment and plan choices versus demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables.  Choice
variations with age, gender, education, and income are not statistically significant, perhaps due to
small sample sizes.  There is a marginally significant tendency for people with low income and
education to more often choose no insurance or the basic Silver plan, even though this group is on
average sicker, and should benefit more from more generous coverage.  Evidence that adverse
selection is responsible for the downward spirals of Gold and Platinum plans is provided by the
panels in Table 2 giving coverage choices versus number of prescriptions used, prior year drug bills,
and self-rated health status (SRHS).  Individuals enrolled in Gold and Platinum plans have above
average 2005 pharmacy bills, and therefore above average expected benefits in 2006, while there
is no significant difference between the pharmacy bills of those who were not enrolled and those
who were enrolled in Silver plans.  These facts suggest that adverse selection was not important at
the enrollment stage, probably as a result of the risk adjustment and statutory mechanisms in place
to mitigate selection, but was important for choice of plan type.  We will explore this aspect of
adverse selection in the reminder of this paper.
3.3. Related Literature.  Duggan, Healy, and Scott-Morton (2008) give a comprehensive review
of the Medicare Part D prescription drug program.  In the remainder of this section, we review
selected recent papers that are directly related to the present paper.
Levy and Weir (2008, 2009) use data from the 2004 and 2006 waves of the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) to estimate the extent of adverse selection into Part D and the impact of
Part D on medication use and out-of-pocket spending.  They conclude that there was substantial
adverse selection into Part D. Among Medicare beneficiaries with no drug coverage in 2004, those
with high use and/or spending in 2004 were most likely to be enrolled in Part D in 2006.  Many of
those who remained without coverage in 2006 reported that they did not use prescription drugs, and
the majority had relatively low out-of-pocket spending.  These results are in line with findings by
Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2006, 2007, 2009).-13-
Levy and Weir (2008) report that the use of prescription drugs did not change dramatically in
response to Medicare Part D.. They conclude that the Part D program has experienced adverse
selection but not moral hazard.  Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) also investigate the effect of Medicare
Part D on prescription drug use and out-of-pocket costs of eligible seniors.  Using data on
prescriptions filled by a large retail pharmacy chain during the period September 2004–December
2006, they estimate that Medicare Part D reduced user cost among the elderly by 18.4 percent,
increased their use of prescription drugs by about 12.8 percent, and increased total U.S. usage by
4.5 percent in 2006.  Lichtenberg and Sun estimate that every seven prescriptions paid for by the
government crowded out five other prescriptions and resulted in only two additional prescriptions
used.  Similarly, Yin et al. (2008) find that the Medicare Part D prescription benefit resulted in
modest increases in average drug utilization and decreases in average out-of-pocket expenditures
among Part D beneficiaries. Using data from a random sample of pharmacy customers who were
beneficiaries of the program after the enrollment deadline, they estimate that the drug benefit saved
beneficiaries about $9 a month and gave them an extra 14 days of pills, on average.  From a public
health policy perspective, an important related issue is whether the introduction of Medicare Part
D has reduced cost-related medication nonadherence, i.e., whether the number of individuals who
do not (re-)fill their prescriptions because they can’t afford it has gone down as a result of Part D.
Madden et al. (2008) conducted surveys among of the population eligible for Medicare Part D before
and after its introduction and found evidence for a small but significant overall decrease in
nonadherence.  However, they did not find a net decrease in nonadherence among the sickest
beneficiaries, who continue to experience higher nonadherence rates; see also Levy-Weir (2008).
Several papers study enrollment and plan choice decision process in more detail.  Heiss,
McFadden, and Winter (2007, 2009), using their RPS internet survey data, as well as Levy and Weir
(2009), using HRS data, conclude that Medicare beneficiaries seem to have been able to make
economically rational decisions about Part D enrollment (but not necessarily plan choice) despite
the complexity of the program.  Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the complex details of
Medicare Part D are poorly understood by seniors.  For instance, Hsu et al (2008) conducted
telephone interviews with a stratified random sample of beneficiaries of a large Medicare Advantage
plan aged 65 years or older.  They found that respondents had limited knowledge of cost sharing
rules, including awareness of the coverage gap, gap start and end amounts, and drug cost sharing-14-
before, during, and after the gap.  A related issue is whether enrollees have picked the best available
option given a level of plan generosity (say, within the class of “enhanced plans”).  Early in this
discussion, Frank and Newhouse (2007) argued that a set of standardized plans should be created
within Part D and that new participants should be automatically enrolled in a plan but allowed to opt
out.  Evidence that has emerged in the meantime appears to supports their view. 
Kling et al. (2008) investigate sub-optimal plan choice from another viewpoint; their analysis
is motivated by recent models of individual misperception of prices.  They present results from a
randomized experiment conducted in the open-enrollment period at the end of 2006 which gave
individuals an opportunity to switch plans.  One group of seniors enrolled in Medicare drug plans
was presented personalized information on the potential cost savings from changing to the lowest
cost plan while another group received information about how to access the Medicare website,
where this same information was available.  The intervention group plan-switching rate was 28
percent, while the comparison group rate was 17 percent. Average predicted costs for 2007 were
lower for the intervention group as a whole and lower for those potentially affected by the
intervention. 
Abaluck and Gruber (2009) analyze plan choice accounting for the wide array of Part D options
available within a level of plan generosity, using a data set of prescription drug claims matched to
information on the characteristics of choice sets. They document that the vast majority of elders are
choosing plans that are not on the “efficient portfolio” of plan choice in the sense that an alternative
plan would have offered better risk protection at a lower cost. Their analysis suggests that
individuals place much more weight on current plan premiums than on expected out-of-pocket costs.
Further, individuals appear to place almost no value on variance reduction.
Also related to the issue of whether consumers can make well-informed choices among a large
number of plans available to them, Lucarelli, Prince, and Simon (2008) study the welfare impacts
of limiting the number of Part D plans based on a joint estimation of plan supply and demand.  They
assess the effects on equilibrium premiums and welfare of reducing product differentiation and of
reducing the maximum number of plans each firm can offer.  Lucarelli et al. find that implied search
costs would have to be at least two thirds of the average monthly premium in order to justify a
regulation that allows only two plans per firm.  This number would be substantially lower if the8Interpret δ(d,d) for d > 0 as a summary of attributes of plan d other than its net cost schedule, such as
convenience, and normalize δ(0,0) = 0.  Interpret δ(d,d-1) as a summary of attributes that also incorporates plan
switching costs when d … d-1.  For example, δ(d,0) - δ(d,d) is the cost of switching from the (initial) state of no
insurance to plan d.  
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limitation in the number of plans were to be coupled with a decrease in product differentiation (e.g.,
by removing plans that provide coverage in the gap). 
4.  A Structural model of Part D enrollment and choice of plan type
To understand adverse selection and its effect on the workings of the market for Part D insurances plans
under different government interventions, we develop a structural model in which individual enrollment and
plan choice are related to features of the market. 
4.1. the Consumer’s Decision Problem.  Let Dt denote the set of choice alternatives for age t,
including different Part D insurance plans and the non-enrollment option.  In our application, Dt =
{0, 1, 2} with the indices corresponding to None, Silver, and Enhanced (Platinum).   Individuals who are alive
at the start of the year in which they are age t make a choice dt from Dt to maximize their expected present
value of utility over the remainder of their life, given information available at the time,
,
where β is a discount rate, Et denotes expectation at age t, sj is an indicator that is one if the individual is
living at the end of the year in which they are age j and zero otherwise, bj is current annual drug bill, and
yj is an indicator of late enrollment penalty status, equal to the number of years the individual has
been eligible for Part D but has not enrolled.  The period-specific utility Uj at age j depends on current
consumption (measured in thousands of dollars per year), which equals permanent income w, less the sum
of out-of-pocket drug costs and drug insurance premiums, c(dj,bj,yj), plus the consumption equivalent of
plan-specific tastes and switching costs, δ(dj,dj-1).
8  The utility Uj may also depend on health status
hj and on a (time-invariant) vector x of individual characteristics such as race, gender, age in 2006
when the Part D market opened, and indicators of socioeconomic status (e.g., education, home
ownership, wealth bracket) in the year the consumer first became eligible for Medicare.  The
expectation Et may also depend on x.  The consumer receives zero utility in the years of death and-16-
beyond, which corresponds to an assumption that deaths occur early in a year, before there is an
opportunity to accrue a part-year utility.  We assume that there is no utility of bequests; this is
consistent with an assumption that permanent income w is a single-life annuity.  We also assume that
the consumer is an individual utility-maximizer, without constraints or utility related to the welfare
of other household members.  We assume that 100 is the maximum attainable age.
This model of the consumer’s decision problem has some significant limitations.  First, it
assumes that utility is intertemporally additive and at the same time captures risk preference through
an expected utility structure; this structure is difficult to reconcile with the theory of intertemporal
risk preferences, particularly when the consumer faces both small scale and large scale risks; see
Epstein and Zin (1989), Rabin (2000).  Second, the model ignores the important influence that
household welfare and joint maximization of household members may have on individual insurance
decisions.  Third, life cycle consumption and savings decisions are simplified by our assumption that
the consumer has a fixed level of permanent income w, and absorbs all current shocks in out-of-
pocket drug costs in current consumption, rather than adjusting assets to smooth drug cost shocks
over time.  This is consistent with the finding that consumers tend to undersmooth consumption,
absorbing most current income shocks through adjustments in current consumption rather than
through changes in assets; see Deaton (1992).  However, the assumption is not plausible when
medical costs reach catastrophic levels that can be paid only through spend-down of assets, and it
leaves out the complex but potentially important interaction of health expenditures, mortality risk,
and asset management over remaining life.  
In addition, limits on data currently available require us to simplify the model by omitting the
dependence of period-specific utility on health status, and excluding plan-specific and switching
effects.  In fact, health may affect the marginal utility of consumption and the degree of risk
aversion.  For example, people in poor health may be restricted in their range of consumption
activities, reducing the marginal utility of consumption.  Use of palliative, preventative, and
therapeutic prescription drugs is a consumer decision that may influence both period-specific utility
and the evolution of health, and one would expect drug utilization to depend on incremental out-of-
pocket cost, and on consumer expectations on drug efficacy for current and future health.  For
example, Goldman et al (2004) finds for some preventative drugs that an increase in use induced by
lower out-of-pocket cost reduces total lifetime medical costs by reducing hospitalizations.  Full-17-
modeling of the causal links from prescription drug choices to future health consequences, and study
of how consumers take these links into account in their insurance choices, may become feasible in
the future when Medicare Part D claims data is made available to researchers.  
In this paper, we model prescription drug coverage solely as insurance against the financial risk
of developing a need for medications.  Omitting the feedback from drug utilization to health is a
reasonable approximation if individuals do not take into account the effect of plan choice on
effective costs and use of drugs, and thereby on subsequent health and life expectancy.  Studies of
intertemporal decision-making suggest that humans lack nuance in their reckoning for future risks;
see Prelec and Loewenstein (1991, 1992), Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002), and
Loewenstein and Elster (1992).   CMS’s Part D “Plan Finder” encourages consumers to compare
plans based solely on benefits calculated for current drugs, and does not dwell on future risks, and
marketing by plan sponsors has the same focus; see Domino et al (2007).  Then, enrollees are
unlikely to exhibit much sensitivity to the future health consequences of variations in drug utilization
induced by level of coverage.  We believe this justifies our approximation.  However, future studies of the
feedbacks from utilization to health are a research priority for understanding the overall social welfare
consequences of health insurance policy.  Even without the feedback from drug utilization to health outcomes,
there will be a correlation of survival and drug expenditures induced by unobserved health status, so that
expectations have to be taken using the joint distribution of these two random variables; e.g.,
developing a cancer will dramatically increase both subsequent drug needs and the mortality risk.
We take this into account by developing and estimating a joint model of health dynamics, drug use,
and mortality.  
4.2. Health and Drug Dynamics.  Given our assumption that when individuals make their
enrollment and plan decisions, they consider the financial consequences only, and disregard
potential feedback effects from the insurance choice to health and mortality, we can specify a model
of health and drug use dynamics and mortality that does not depend on insurance coverage.  Due to
the late enrollment penalty, a rational enrollment decision today must take into account all future
consequences.  A rational individual therefore has to form expectations for the future evolution of
health, drug needs, and mortality.  Plan choice for enrollees, on the other hand, does not have to be
farsighted if plan switching costs are absent – only pharmacy bill risks in the coming year will then
matter for choice of coverage level.  -18-
Assume that in addition to observable characteristics of an individual x, survival status st, late
enrollment penalty status yt, and independent random shocks, self-reported health rt (with categories
j = 1,...,5 respectively for excellent, very good, good, fair, poor), drug use bt (equal to the annual
pharmacy bill), and mortality mt (equal to zero if alive, one otherwise) are all driven by the
individual’s health state ht, a variable that is not observed directly.  We interpret ht as an individual’s
frailty relative to the cohort with the same observable covariates x, and normalize it at age 65 to have
a standard normal distribution, independent of x.  We assume that ht evolves as age increases
according to a stationary AR(1) process  , where vt is standard normal and ρ
is the serial correlation.  The survival indicator satisfies st = (1 - mt)st-1, with st = 0 an absorbing state
after which none of the variables rj,  yt, or mj are observable.  The distribution of ht among survivors
at ages above 65 will be shaped by selection.  The enrollment status indicator advances by one for
each year past 65 in which the consumer is not enrolled in a prescription drug plan, so that yt = yt-1
+ 1(dt=0).
Conditional on a sequence {h1 ,..., hT} and the covariates x, all outcomes {r1 ,..., rT, b1,..., bT, m1
,...,  mT} are assumed to be mutually independent.  We specify parametric models for these
probabilities.  Denote the CDF of a logistic random variable z by Λ(z)= 1/(1 + exp(-z)).  We specify the
conditional mortality risk as
 
Pr(mt = 1 | x, h1 ,..., hT) = Λ(xκm + λtm + htγm),
where κm, λtm, and γm are parameters, with λtm (which in general may depend on x) determining age-specific
mortality rates given consumer characteristic x and relative health h.  For self-rated health, we specify for
j=1,..,5
Pr(rt = j | x, h1 ,..., hT) = Λ(θjr + xκr + λtr + htγr) -  Λ(θj-1,r + xκr + λtr + htγr),
where κr, λtr, γr and θjr are parameters, with θ0r = -4 and θ5r = +4.  Drug bills are discretized into B = 12
categories described in Table 3.  The conditional outcome probabilities for j = 1,..,12 are
Pr(bt = j | x,h1 ,..., hT) = Λ(θjb + xκb + λtb + htγb) -  Λ(θj-1,b + xκb + λtb + ht γb),-19-
where κb, λtb, γb, and θjb are parameters with θ0b = -4 and θ12,b = +4.  Heiss (2009) presents a similar
model for health and mortality without prescription drugs and shows that it captures well the
evolution of these variables. 
We estimate this model using the method of Heiss (2008) and data from the Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).  A detailed description of this data set and the sample we use for our
estimation can be found in the Appendix.  In Table 4, we report the parameter estimates.  The latent
health component is highly correlated over time, with estimated yearly correlations of 0.97 for males
and 0.96 for females, but both parameters are highly significantly smaller than one.  This implies
that ten years after a health shock, 66 percent ( = 0.96
10) of it is still present.  The latent health
component highly significantly affects all three outcome equations, leading to contemporaneous and
intertemporal correlation of self-reported health status (SRHS), drug use, and mortality.  High
education is associated with better SRHS, reduced drug use, and lower mortality.  Health status
varies with race, with non-whites reporting worse SRHS, non-white females using less drugs, and
the mortality rates slightly elevated for non-white males relative to white males. 
4.3. Optimal Insurance Choice Given Health and Drug Dynamics.  We will assume that
rational individuals make their enrollment and plan choices employing expectations regarding
current and future pharmacy bill risks that are consistent with our estimated model for health, drug
needs, and mortality.  When making a choice for age t, individuals are assumed to know their current




-1((R-0.5)/R)}, with R=1000 nodes, where Φ
-1() denotes the inverse CDF of the standard normal
distribution.
Using the notation of Section 4.1, assume a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) single-
period utility function of consumption,
u(w-c(d,b,y))) = [1 - exp(-α(w-c(d,b,y)))]/α  = [1 - exp(-αw)exp(αc(d,b,y))]/α.
A risk-adverse individual will have α > 0, while an individual who is risk-neutral will have α = 0
and period-specific utility u(w-c(d,b,y)) = w - c(d,b,y).  The CARA period-specific utility is also
well-defined in the case of risk-affinity, α < 0, so preferences in this range are allowed.-20-
The decision problem corresponds to a finite horizon Markov decision processes and can be
solved by backward recursion, see Rust (1994).  First, consider the decision for the final age 100,
made if the consumer is alive at age 99 and knows her health status h99.  Expected utility given plan
choice d, previous health status h99, and number of years previously uninsured y99 is
.
Individuals maximize this expression by choosing the best insurance state d*100 0 D100.  This yields
the value function for the final year of life,  V100(h99, y99) = maxd U(d | h99, y99).  Now suppose that
by backward induction one has reached the decision at an age t < 100.  The value function to be
maximized is the expected discounted utility value over remaining live given optimal decisions in
the future. Given health status ht and insurance status yt, the value function Vt+1(ht, yt) is available
from previous calculations.  Choosing the best alternative for age t given information available at
t-1 then yields the value function 
          ,
with a maximand d*t.  The backward recursion is carried back to the age of initial eligibility for each
exogenous  x, determining the optimal policy function at each age t for each of the finite number of
possible states {ht-1,yt-1}.  The optimization model depends on the coefficient of risk aversion α and
the discount factor β; these are varied parametrically in our simulations.
5. Simulation results
We use the dynamic decision model described in the previous section to simulate choices of a population
of individual “active deciders” in a stylized market for Medicare Part D plans.  We assume that this market
offers a large number of identical plans in each of two types, Silver plans that are actuarially equivalent to9 As in many intertemporal choice situations, decisions are fairly insensitive to discount factors β in the
conventional range near one.
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the Medicare Part D Standard plan, and Platinum plans that eliminate the gap.  We assume that Silver plans
have the Standard plan’s benefit schedule, with a deductible and a coverage gap, while the Platinum plan has
no deductible, 75% coverage up to its drug bill catastrophic threshold of $14,400, and 95% coverage above
that value.  We abstract from formulary restrictions, and assume that the plans offered in our hypothetical
market cover all drugs.  We omit the intermediate coverage plans previously labeled “Gold” that cover some
generic drugs in the gap, but not brand-name drugs, and assume they are absent from the market.  These are
clearly substantial simplifications relative to the actual Part D market, but they provide a clear contrast in plan
types that allows us to draw conclusions on the impact of adverse selection on the viability of enhanced
plans.
Individuals differ by gender, age, race, education, and current level of relative health, h0.  For each
combination of these characteristics, we simulate optimal decisions (enrollment and plan type choice) by
backward induction given premiums for the plan types and the institutional features of the market.  The
government interventions we analyze are (i) the number of plan types and their payment schedules, (ii) the
late-enrollment penalty, (iii) premium subsidies, and (iv) risk adjustment; the scenarios we construct in these
four dimensions we will be described below in more detail.   We aggregate the simulated optimal
decisions using the population distribution of the characteristics of active deciders to infer the distribution
of drug expenditures by enrollment and plan type status, given premiums. These distributions together with
the institutional features determine the profits of the plan sponsors, again given premiums. The plan sponsors’
profit is given by the difference between premiums collected and drug costs reimbursed, plus subsidies and
risk-adjustment payments specified in the scenario. We abstract from administrative cost and any cost
reductions sponsors can achieve by negotiating drug prices with the pharmaceutical industry. Assuming a
competitive market, the equilibrium will be defined by zero profits. For given institutional arrangements, we
can in particular determine whether a zero-profit premium exists.
In our simulations, we fix the discount factor at β = 0.95.
9  We also present results for perfectly myopic
preferences (β = 0); assuming that plan switching is costless, this is equivalent to an institutional scenario that
does not have a late-enrollment penalty.  To investigate the sensitivity of our simulations to the level of risk
aversion, we use four alternative values for the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (α = 0, 0.1, 0.2,-22-
and 0.5).  For a gamble with a 50% chance of winning $5000, these parameters imply a willingness to pay
of $2500, $2191, $1899, and $1229, respectively.  Finally, the distributions of gender, age, race, education,
and current level of relative health are based on the MCBS data that were also used to construct the state
transition probabilities; see section 4.2.
5.1. A market with Silver Plans only.  We first consider a market in which only Silver Plans are
offered. The purposes of this analysis are (i) to replicate some key features of the Medicare Part D market
using our stylized model, (ii) to investigate the sensitivity of our simulations to variations in risk aversion,
and (iii) to study the effect of the LEP and of premium subsidies on enrollment and viability of plans.
As specified in the model in section 4, individuals decide whether to enroll into a Silver Plan or remain
uncovered. Figure 2 shows the share of the population who finds it advantageous to enroll as a function of
the monthly premium, stratified by whether the government imposes the late-enrollment penalty (LEP) and
by the degree of risk aversion.  At a zero premium, the entire population of rational deciders enrolls
voluntarily. As the premium increases, an increasing fraction of individuals do not find it beneficial to enroll.
The rate at which enrollment decreases as the premiums increases depends on risk preferences and on
whether the LEP is enforced. Without the LEP (and with costless switching, as we assume throughout), the
rational enrollment decision takes into account only the expected drug expenditures in the first year; an
alternative interpretation is that individuals are myopic.  In this situation, the enrollment rate is 62% at a
monthly premium of $100.  Risk aversion has little impact on the results. When the LEP is enforced,
enrollment rates are higher because individuals take into account the chance that drug expenditures will
increase in the second year or beyond; enrollment rates at a $100 premium are 75% when individuals are risk
neutral and rise to 91% when they are highly risk averse (α = 0.5). 
Those individuals who rationally decide not to enroll are relatively healthy. The higher the premium, the
more extreme is the adverse selection into Medicare Part D plans.  Figure 3 depicts this effect.  It shows the
average drug bill of the individuals who rationally enroll, which increases from the population average of
$3100 at a zero premium at which all enroll to $4330 at a monthly premium of $100 when there is no LEP.
As intended, the LEP mitigates adverse selection when individuals are rational.  With LEP, average annual
drug bills at a $100 premium are $3360 when α = 0.5 and $3860 when α = 0.  
The composition of the enrollees together with the government interventions and subsidies determine
the profits for a given premium. Figure 4 shows profits given the simulated populations of enrollees under
alternative values of the risk aversion parameter, given the actual CMS subsidies described in Section 3.2.-23-
It is important to note that given these high subsidies, risk aversion and the LEP have little effect on the zero-
profit premium.  In the absence of more generous plans, the Silver Plan is profitable at monthly premiums
of $35 and above. At this low premium, most risk-neutral rational individuals find it advantageous to enroll
even when only first year costs and benefits matter; risk aversion or the LEP induce only a few more
individuals to enroll. Notice that the simulated zero-profit premium is strikingly close to observed average
premiums for Part D Silver plans; see Table 1.
To study the effects of the subsidies on the market equilibrium, we show in Figure 5 profits as a function
of premiums, keeping risk aversion fixed at an intermediate value (α = 0.2) and varying the level of
government subsidies. In addition to the current Medicare Part D subsidy, we show scenarios without
subsidies and with the 80% reinsurance for catastrophic drug bills only. In the absence of any subsidies, there
is no premium at which insurance companies can offer a Silver plan without incurring losses. This is a classic
market failure due to adverse selection.  Alternately, with catastrophic reinsurance only and the LEP, the
zero-profit premium is $124, without the LEP it is $143. At these respective premiums, 68% and 31% of
rational individuals would enroll.
5.2. A market with Silver and Platinum plans.  To analyze the selection of individuals into different
plan types, we introduce a Platinum plan in addition to the Silver plan. We assume throughout this section
that there is an LEP, and we keep the premium of the Silver Plan fixed at $35 per month.
Figure 6 shows enrollment rates for the two types of plans, with the premium of the Platinum plan on
the horizontal axis.  At a $40 monthly premium, almost the entire population enrolls in the Platinum Plan,
which has much better coverage and is only slightly more expensive than the Silver Plan. As the premium
of the Platinum Plan increases, its enrollment share decreases. The degree of risk aversion has almost no
impact on relative enrollment in to two plan types. Those individuals who decide to switch from the Platinum
Plan to the Silver Plan as the former’s premium increases are among the best risks among the enrollees of
the Platinum Plan and among the worst risks among the Silver Plan. Therefore, as Figure 7 shows, the
average drug bill of the enrollees increases in both plan types as the premium of the Platinum Plan increases
– this is adverse selection at work. 
Are the Platinum Plans viable given that there is such strong adverse selection? To answer this question,
we now must consider risk adjustment as well.  Figure 8 shows the profits of both plan types, keeping the
Silver Plan premium fixed at $35 and the risk aversion coefficient at its intermediate level of 0.2.  Without
any risk adjustment, the Silver Plan makes positive profits at a premium of $35/month.  Compared to the case-24-
with Silver Plans only in which this premium generated zero profits, this is due to the fact that the worst risks
have moved to the Platinum plan.  The Platinum plan incur losses at any premium, so the market for them
is not viable without risk adjustment.  This is due to the fact that Platinum plans receive no additional subsidy
even though they are drawing the worst risks and in effect cross-subsidizing Silver plans. 
Since the enhanced plans draw the worst risks, on average they receive net payments from the risk
adjustment, but this is not sufficient to compensate for the additional risks.  In addition to that, the risk
adjustment is only based on liabilities for the Standard Plan portion of the benefits and additional benefits
are not compensated.  We add risk adjustment to our simulations using the formula described in Section 3.1.
Figure 8 shows the profits with the implemented risk adjustment.  Since the Standard Plans have a positive
selection of enrollees, they are net payers for the risk adjustment an their profit decrease.  But they are still
positive since risk adjustment is imperfect.  This and the fact that enhanced benefits are unadjusted leads to
the result that profits for the enhanced plans increase but not nearly as much as needed to become non-
negative for any premium.
Let B
Si denote expected Standard plan benefit cost for individual i, scaled so that it averages to one over
the entire Medicare population.  Letting B
SA denote the average of B
Si over a sponsor’s enrollees, the net risk
payment to this sponsor per enrollee under risk adjustment as implemented is (B
SA - 1)@(Bid), with B
SA
estimated from the regression described in Robst, Levy, and Ingbas (2007).  Figure 10 also shows results
using a “full” risk adjustment that undoes all effects of selection on profits per enrollee in both the Standard
and enhanced plans.   Let B
Ei denote the expected enhanced plan benefit cost for individual i, again scaled
so that it averages to one over the entire Medicare population.  If the sponsor sets an incremental premium
for enhanced coverage equal to the expected incremental benefit cost for a representative individual, then
the risk adjustment per enrollee that would leave sponsor expected profit invariant to his enrollee mix and
its distribution across plan types is
θS(B
SS - 1)(Bid) + θE(B
EE - 1)(Bid + Enhanced Coverage Incremental Premium)
= (B
SA - 1)(Bid) + θE(B
EE - 1)(Enhanced Coverage Incremental Premium),
where θS and θE are the shares of enrollees in the sponsor’s Standard and enhanced plans, and B
SS and B
EE
are the averages of B
Si and B
Ei over the sponsor’s enrollees in these respective plans.  Our “full” risk-25-
adjustment assumes that the terms in this net subsidy are exact, rather than estimated; this corresponds to
retrospective rather than prospective risk adjustment.  With this “full” risk adjustment, there is a joint
equilibrium in which both plan types generate zero profits at premiums of $35 for the Standard plan and $102
for the enhanced plan.  Note that this risk adjustment is not budget neutral.  At the equilibrium, total
government spending on Part D would have to be increased by 17%.  
In practice, the government does not want to compensate sponsors fully for the spending of their
enrollees in order to maintain the incentive to keep spending low.  A practical version of the “full” risk
adjustment scheme could define two plan types like those modeled here.  Sponsors for a plan of one type
would be compensated for the difference of average liabilities associated with the spending of the whole
eligible population and the individuals who are enrolled in a plan of the same type.  This would undo all
selection effects into plan types while maintaining the competition of sponsors within each plan type.
5.3 A market with Platinum Plans only.  The coverage gap – the infamous doughnut hole – has been
a major concern in the debate surrounding the introduction of Medicare Part D, and proposals to abolish it
abound. In this last section, we present simulation results for a market in which only Platinum plans that
provide coverage through the gap are offered. We restrict attention here to the case of a high level of risk
aversion (α=0.5). The sequence in which we present the simulation results is that same as in the previous
sections.
Figure 9 shows enrollment rates in the Platinum plan as a function of the monthly premium. As before,
at a zero premium all eligible individuals enroll. As the premium increases, those individuals with lower
current and/or expected future drug expenditure drop out, following the intertemporal optimization model.
Enrollment rates are lower when there is no late enrollment penalty or when individuals are myopic since
in either case, the possibility of larger future drug expenditures is not taken into account. The enrollment rates
shown in this figure are, for any given premium, higher than those in a market with only a Silver plan (Figure
2). For instance, at a $100 monthly premium and with the LEP in effect, if only one plan type were offered,
94% of rational, highly risk averse individuals would enroll in a Platinum plan, and 91% in a less generous
Silver plan. The difference between enrollment rates in the two Scenarios gets larger with increasing
premiums as selection leads to enrollees with higher current or higher expected future drug bills for whom
gap coverage is more important.  At a monthly premium of $35, the differences in enrollment rates are small.
Figure 10 shows average drug bill of those enrolled in a Platinum plan when that is the only plan type
in the market. As in Figure 3, drug bills increase with premiums due to adverse selection. This increase is-26-
less pronounced than in the market with only a Silver plan since more individuals enroll at higher premiums,
reducing adverse selection. Taking again rational, highly risk averse individuals in market with a late
enrollment penalty, the average annual drug bill per enrollee is $3280 in a Platinum-only market and $3360
in a Silver-only market at the same premium of $100.
Figure 11 shows sponsor profit as a function of premium.  For this simulation, we keep the subsidy per
enrollee at the same dollar level as the current implementation of the Standard plan.  Sponsors can break even
at a premium of $55 per month, at which enrollment remains very high.  The reason that the premium
increase over current levels required for viability is modest is that all enrollees, including the relatively
healthy who do not reach the gap, share the cost of gap coverage.  This policy alternative would reduce
problems of non-adherence to drug therapies when marginal drug costs rise sharply when enrollees hit the
gap, and simplify the Part D program without additional government subsidies.
6.  Conclusions
In this paper, we study how high voluntary enrollment rates can be achieved in a competitive private
market for health insurance through subsidies and tight regulation.  We base our analysis on the Medicare
Part D prescription drug insurance program offered to older Americans since 2006.
Two features of enrollment and plan supply during the first four years of Medicare Part D motivate our
analysis: First, enrollment rates are high, with non-enrollment coming primarily from healthy “active
deciders”.  Second, premiums for standard plans as well as the number of plans among which consumers can
choose have remained reasonably stable over time.  Then, the Medicare Part D market design has achieved
its primary political goal of providing near-universal coverage in a viable private market.  Put differently, Part
D has effectively countered adverse selection into a non-compulsory health insurance program through
subsidies that makes Part D a favorable lottery for most, through inducing enrollment by the healthy due to
the option value of avoiding late enrollment penalties, and through exploitation of advantageous selection
resulting from higher levels of risk aversion among the healthy and wealthy.  Second, plans with enhanced
coverage have a falling share of the market, an apparent consequence of adverse selection in plan choice.
Non-capitated extended plans contain an implicit tax due to the delayed onset of catastrophic reinsurance,
and this load and the absence of any direct government subsidy for extended benefits reinforce the effects
of adverse selection of sicker consumers into enhanced plans.-27-
The main goal of our analysis was to understand the role of different government interventions in
countering adverse selection.  To this end, we develop a structural intertemporal decision model of
enrollment and plan-type choice, and to use this model to simulate market demand under alternative
institutional arrangements.  In particular, this structural model allows us to distinguish the separate effects
of four institutional features of Medicare Part D: direct government subsidies, government catastrophic
reinsurance, the late enrollment penalty, and risk adjustment.  An important finding is that elasticities of
enrollment with respect to premiums are very low at the current subsidy and resulting range of premiums.
Then, the program could tolerate modest increases in premiums, particularly if these are used to enhance plan
benefits rather than shave subsidies, without jeopardizing the target of nearly universal enrollment.
  Summarizing our baseline simulation results, our model successfully replicates two key outcomes in the
Part D market:  A large proportion of the population enrolls, with only the healthiest individuals choosing
not to purchase coverage.  At the same time, adverse selection strongly affects selection between Standard
plans and enhanced plans that provide coverage in the Standard plan gap.  In fact, the market for enhanced
plans, whose extra coverage is not subsidized, breaks down in our simulations, with demand driven to zero
as premiums rise to covers expected benefit cost.  
We analyze the effect of subsidies.  Our baseline simulation had subsidies similar to those provided with
Medicare Part D, around 80% of sponsor cost.  At zero subsidies, our simulations confirm that a private
market for prescription drug insurance is not viable, even with regulation that fixes a single Standard plan
type and eliminates costly screening by requiring that sponsors accept all applicants at a posted premium.
At a level of subsidies at which the government provides only reinsurance, covering about 30% of sponsor
cost, the market is viable, but premiums would be substantially higher, and enrollment rates would be much
lower, so that the government would not reach its political goal of near-universal coverage.
Next, we analyzed the late enrollment penalty which was also intended to counter adverse selection by
providing incentives for younger, healthy individuals to enroll.  Ours simulations show that given the high
level of subsidies provided in Medicare Part D, the late enrollment penalty has a negligible additional effect
on enrollment rates.  This complicated and controversial feature of Medicare Part D thus does not seem to
be essential to counter adverse selection in enrollment, although it could become important at higher
premiums.  If in reality, consumers don't understand or neglect the penalty's intertemporal incentives, its
effects will be even smaller.  -28-
We investigate alternative risk adjustment schemes.  The implemented risk adjustment is not sufficient
to make enhanced plans viable.  We explore a “full” risk adjustment that subsidizes the difference between
the benefit cost of the actual mix of enrollees in a given plan type, and the benefit cost if these enrollees were
all representative of the population.  This adjustment would make enhanced plans viable, at a cost of an
increase of about17% in the total government subsidy of this market.
Finally, we examine the impact of eliminating the gap in Standard plan coverage, estimating the effect
of replacing the Standard plan with a Platinum plan that covers 75% of all formulary drug costs in the gap.
We find that a modest increase in Part D premiums to around $55 per month from the current $35 per month
would make this alternative viable, with no increase in current subsidies.  Thus, it appears to be practical to
eliminate the gap in the Part D Standard plan at current subsidy levels , a simplification that would appeal
to consumers, without threatening the viability of the market.
An important limitation of our analysis is that we take drug use as given.  In our model, consumers take
all prescribed medications even if they are hit by a negative health shock that implies a very high drug bill.
This is not realistic - in fact, non-adherence related to drug costs is well documented (Goldman, et al.  2004)
and has been a major argument for the introduction of Medicare Part D.  To address these effects in a
structural model, one would need allow for drug use as a choice variable and specify (i) a utility function that
depends not only on consumption (or disposable income net of drug and insurance costs as in our
implementation) but also on health, and (ii) a technology that maps drug use into health outcomes so that
current non-adherence may have negative health effects in the future.  These are promising, but very
demanding modeling issues which we leave to future research.
Two broad questions to which our research can give only partial answers is whether Medicare Part D
has performed better than a conventional government-run single-payer system would have done, and whether
the Part D market should be a model for general health insurance reform.  On the first question, what we can
say is that the Part D market seems to be successful in providing access and coverage at a reasonable
administrative cost, and that competition between sponsors seems to have induced innovative cost-cutting.
Most importantly, the market establishes that it is feasible to subsidize and regulate a private insurance
market so that it is viable and meets broad social policy needs for access.  The evidence for adverse selection
in plan type choice indicates that preservation of variety should be one of the criterion for the design of
private insurance market regulations.  On the second question, we conclude that the Part D market is-29-
sufficiently successful so that a private insurance market with subsidies and tight regulation should be one
of the candidates for comprehensive health insurance reform.  References
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A.1 The Retirement Perspectives Survey
Four waves of the Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS) were administered in 2005, 2006, 2007, and
2009 to obtain data on health status, prescription drug use, and Medicare Part D enrollment and plan
type choice by U.S. seniors. The sample was obtained using an internet panel of individuals maintained
by Knowledge Networks (KN), a commercial survey firm. The members of the KN Panel are recruited
from an initial sample obtained by random-digit-dialing sampling that is representative of the U.S. non-
institutionalized population in terms of demographics and socioeconomic status. Participants are
provided with web TV hardware to respond to periodic internet surveys with content from both
commercial and academic clients. KN Panel members are compensated for participation. For a detailed
discussion of representativeness of the RPS sample and of the weighting procedures employed, see
Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2007, 2009).
The first RPS wave (RPS 2005) was conducted in November 2005, just before the initial enrollment
period for the new Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit began. This survey focused on prescription
drug use and intentions to enroll in the new Medicare Part D program. Additional questions concerned
long-term care, and a sequence of questions was designed to obtain simple measures of respondents’
risk attitudes. The second wave (RPS 2006) was fielded in May 2006, after the initial enrollment period
had ended. For this survey, the Medicare eligible respondents of RPS 2005 we re-contacted, and their
prescription drug insurance status and their Part D decisions were obtained. Two additional waves (RPS
2007 and RPS 2009) were conducted in March/April 2007 and February/March 2009, respectively; their
samples consisted of re-interviewed respondents of earlier RPS waves plus refreshment cases. The four
RPS interviews required between 25 and 40 minutes for completion, with variations due to variations
in the length of the questionnaire. 
The variables age, gender, education, and monthly net household income were provided as
respondent background data by Knowledge Networks. The variables “number of prescription drugs
taken on a regular basis”, “self-rated health status” (SRHS), and the Medicare Part D enrollment status
were elicited in the RPS questionnaires. The total annual expenditure for prescription drugs was
estimated based on detailed information elicited in the RPS questionnaires, using the methods described
by Winter et al. (2006). Summary statistics for these variables are contained in Table A.1.1 As of September 16, 2009, the internet address for the CMS Medicare Part D data page is
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/, but the location of plan feature and enrollment files changes
over time. Copies of the CMS Excel data files as used for this paper are available from the authors on request.
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A.2 Construction of the Medicare Part D supply and demand data reported in Table 1
Table 1 summarizes the supply of, and demand for, Medicare Part D stand-alone plans in the
first four years of the program, 2006–2009. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes features of the stand-
alone plans that were offered in those years. The raw data, including premiums and plan features
such as deductible, gap coverage, and limited details on the plan formulary, were obtained from
the web site of the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
1 Panel B reports enrollment
data for the universe of individuals eligible for Medicare Part D; the raw data were also taken from
the CMS web site. Panel C reports enrollment data for “active deciders” estimated using the RPS
data. Active deciders are defined as individuals who make and pay for their drug insurance choice. 
This excludes individuals with existing coverage for prescription drugs (most importantly from a
current or former employer’s health insurance) as well individuals on Medicaid and programs such
as FEHB and TRICARE are excluded. Additional details and remarks on the construction of the
variables reported in Table 1 follow. 
1. Number of plans offered (Panel A): These figures refer to the number of unique plans offered by
sponsors, including regional and national plans offered in one or more states.  As explained in section 3.2,
plans are classified as “Silver” if they have no gap coverage, “Gold” if they have gap coverage primarily
for generic drugs, and “Platinum” if they have gap coverage for all drugs.  The CMS identification system
for plans was modified after 2006, and the 2006 counts and shares are generally but not strictly
comparable to these statistics in later years. 
1. Share-weighted mean premium (Panel A): These figures refer to the average premium weighted
by total enrollment of aged and disabled in individual plans. The percent increase is year over
year, in current prices.
2. Medicare-eligible population (Panel B): These figures refer to the count of Medicare eligible
individuals aged 65 and older without drug insurance (???); obtained using an assumption
supplied for 2006 by the Office of the Actuary at CMS that 32% of the disabled do not have Part
D or other creditable drug insurance.
3. Prescription-drug insurance status (Panel B): The category “other” includes Medicare retiree subsidy
plans such as FEHB and TRICARE. 2 See the CMS internet site at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCBS for details on the MCBS.
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4. Active deciders (Panel C): The share of active deciders is estimated from the count of uninsured
1individuals aged 65 and older and the share of uninsured respondents in RPS 2006, RPS 2007, and
RPS 2009.  In 2008, RPS data on active deciders was incomplete, and the share is interpolated from
2007 and 2009.
5. Shares of Silver, Gold, and Platinum plans (Panel C): These numbers are calculated from
corresponding RPS shares for weighted sample individuals for in 2006, 2007, and 2009, adjusted by
iterative proportional fitting to match the marginal distribution of individuals with no coverage
reported by CMS.  The 2008 shares are interpolated using the 2007, 2008, and 2009 shares among
PDP plans for the enrolled Medicare population.
A.3 Construction of the MCBS dataset used to the estimate the dynamic health model
The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) is a nationally representative survey designed to elicit
healthcare utilization and expenditures for the Medicare population, especially those expenditures born by the
beneficiary or supplemental insurance. It is administered by the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
2 The sample frame consists of aged and disabled
beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Part A and/or Part B; for our purposes, only the aged (Medicare Part A)
beneficiaries are relevant. The MCBS attempts to interview each person twelve times over three years, regardless
of whether he or she resides in the community, a facility, or transitions between community and facility settings.
The first MCBS interview was conducted in 1991. Since 1996, the MCBS uses a rotating panel design. Each fall
a new panel is introduced, with a target sample size of 12,000 respondents, and each summer a panel is retired
so that respondents remain in the sample for three years; for each respondent, there are at most four observations
(one baseline survey and up to three “continuation” surveys). The MCBS contains self-reported information,
including self-reported health status (SRHS); the prevalence of various health conditions; and measures of
physical limitation in performing daily activities (ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs).  In
addition, the MCBS contains detailed self-reported data on health service use, as well as Medicare service use
records. In this paper, we a dataset combined from the Access to Care files (1999-2002) and the Cost and Use files
(2000-2003). Summary statistics are reported in Table A.2.Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the RPS dataset
2006 2007 2009
Age band
-64 411 19.8% 204 7.6% 24 1.5%
65-69 550 26.5% 863 32.4% 538 34.1%
70-79 832 40.1% 1,180 44.2% 781 49.6%
80-89 262 12.6% 393 14.7% 214 13.6%
90+ 22 1.1% 27 1.0% 19 1.2%
Non-missing total 2077 2667 1576
Gender
Male 937 45.1% 1,186 44.5% 707 44.9%
Female 1,140 54.9% 1,481 55.5% 869 55.1%
Non-missing total 2,077 2,667 1,576
Education
Up to high school 1,162 55.9% 1,392 52.2% 770 48.9%
More than high school 915 44.1% 1,275 47.8% 806 51.1%
Non-missing total 2,077 2,667 1,576
Total household net income
Below $20,000 511 24.6% 577 21.6% 232 14.7%
$20,000 to 60,000 1,160 55.8% 1,534 57.5% 859 54.5%
More than $60,000 406 19.5% 556 20.8% 485 30.8%
Non-missing total 2077 2667 1576
Number of prescription drugs taken on a regular basis
None 177 9.9% 260 9.7% 186 11.8%
1 or 2 501 28.0% 659 24.7% 346 22.0%
3 or more 1,113 62.1% 1,748 65.5% 1044 66.2%
Non-missing total 1791 2667 1576
Estimated total annual prescription drug cost
costs=0 268 12.9% 227 13.8% 117 14.0%
0<costs<=250 130 6.3% 112 6.8% 59 7.1%
250<costs<=1000 204 9.8% 177 10.7% 86 10.3%
1000<costs<=2250 559 26.9% 459 27.9% 225 26.9%
2250<costs<=5100 617 29.7% 467 28.4% 248 29.7%
costs>5100 299 14.4% 205 12.4% 100 12.0%
Non-missing total 2077 1647 835
Self-rated health status (SRHS)
Excellent 121 5.8% 138 5.2% 86 5.5%
Very good or good 1,407 67.8% 1,883 70.7% 1132 71.9%
Poor or fair 546 26.3% 641 24.1% 357 22.7%
Non-missing total 2074 2662 1575
Education-income interactions
Low education, low income 353 17.0% 393 14.7% 151 9.6%
Low education, mid income 667 32.1% 817 30.6% 470 29.8%
Low education, high income 142 6.8% 182 6.8% 149 9.5%
High edudation, low income 158 7.6% 184 6.9% 81 5.1%
High education, mid income 493 23.7% 717 26.9% 389 24.7%
High education, high income 264 12.7% 374 14.0% 336 21.3%
Non-missing total 2077 2667 1576
Total 2077 2667 1576

















Up to high school 21,422 61.8%










Continuous variables N Mean St.Dev. Median Min  Max
Age 34,647 77.05 6.99 76 67 104
Prescription drug costs ($1000) 34,647 6.13 3.12 6 1 12
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Table 1.  Part D Plan and Enrollment Statistics, 2006-2009
Sub-category percentages are in italics
A. Market for Stand-Alone PDP  2006 2007 2008 2009
Count Share Count Share Count Share Count Share
Number of Plans Offered [1]
    Silver 1236 84.3% 1,359 71.2% 1331 70.9% 1309 75.2%
    Gold 190 13.0% 525 27.5% 546 29.1% 432 24.8%
    Platinum 40 2.7% 25 1.3% --- --- --- ---
    Total Classified 1466 100.0% 1909 100.0% 1877 100.0% 1741 100.0%
Share-Weighted Mean Premium [2] Mean Pct Incr Mean Pct Incr Mean Pct Incr Mean Pct Incr
    Silver $26.50 --- $24.50 -7.8% $27.10 10.1% $32.20 17.2%
    Gold $48.70 --- $54.40 11.1% $66.80 20.5% $73.60 9.7%
    Platinum $47.90 --- $103.90 77.4% --- --- --- ---
B.  Enrollment -- Eligible Universe
Medicare-eligible population (mil) [3] Count Share Count Share Count Share Count Share
    Age 65+ 36.32 85.2% 36.99 85.4% 37.68 85.3% 38.40 84.9%
    Disabled 64- 6.32 14.8% 6.32 14.6% 6.52 14.7% 6.84 15.1%
    Total 42.64 100.0% 43.31 100.0% 44.20 100.0% 45.24 100.0%
Prescription Drug Insurance Status (mil)
[4]
Count Share Count Share Count Share Count Share
    No coverage 4.42 10.4% 4.28 9.9% 4.61 10.4% 4.46 9.9%
        Age 65+ 2.40 5.6% 2.26 5.2% 2.33 5.3% 2.27 5.0%
    Stand-alone PDP coverage 16.44 38.6% 17.25 39.8% 17.39 39.3% 17.48 38.6%
        Silver 15.55 36.5% 15.79 36.5% 16.12 36.5% 16.30 36.0%
        Gold 0.86 2.0% 1.34 3.1% 1.27 2.9% 1.18 2.6%
        Platinum 0.02 0.1% 0.12 0.3% 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0%
    MA and related plans 6.04 14.2% 6.65 15.4% 8.01 18.1% 9.17 20.3%
    Other creditable coverage 15.74 36.9% 15.13 34.9% 14.19 32.1% 14.13 31.2%
    Total 42.64 100.0% 43.31 100.0% 44.20 100.0% 45.24 100.0%
C.  Enrollment -- Active Deciders Age
65+ 
Count Share Count Share Count Share Count Share
Medicare-eligible Age 65+ population
(mil)
36.32 36.99 37.68 38.40
    Active Deciders [5] 9.58 26.4% 9.48 25.6% 9.71 25.3% 10.00 26.0%
        No coverage [6] 2.40 25.0% 2.26 23.8% 2.33 23.2% 2.27 22.7%
        Silver 6.51 67.9% 4.20 44.3% 4.77 49.1% 6.62 66.2%
        Gold 0.39 4.1% 3.01 31.7% 2.68 27.7% 1.11 11.1%
        Platinum 0.29 3.0% 0.02 0.2% --- --- --- ---
Sources and Notes: See Appendix A.2. -40-
     Table 2. Enrollment and Plan Choices of RPS Respondents
Age 65-69 70+
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 18.3% 21.8% 32.9% 25.2% 24.3% 40.7%
Silver 72.5% 44.3% 61.6% 68.5% 46.1% 49.4%
Gold + Platinum 9.2% 33.9% 5.5% 6.3% 29.6% 9.9%
Count 142 174 73 270 371 162
Gender Male Female
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 21.5% 26.7% 42.4% 22.0% 22.1% 35.3%
Silver 69.2% 46.6% 50.5% 71.8% 44.8% 55.1%
Gold + Platinum 9.3% 26.7% 7.1% 6.3% 33.0% 9.6%
Count 172 206 99 287 348 136
Education Up through High School_ More than High School
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 23.2% 23.8% 39.2% 19.8% 23.8% 37.3%
Silver 68.4% 46.7% 52.8% 74.3% 43.8% 53.6%
Gold + Platinum 8.5% 29.5% 8.0% 5.9% 32.3% 9.1%
Count 272 319 125 187 235 110
Income Income below $20K Income $20K or more
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 16.8% 27.8% 42.5% 23.9% 22.7% 37.4%
Silver 77.4% 38.9% 50.0% 68.0% 47.4% 53.8%
Gold + Platinum 5.8% 33.3% 7.5% 8.1% 29.9% 8.7%
Count 137 126 40 322 428 195
Prescriptions Less than Three Three or More
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 33.1% 43.5% 56.1% 7.3% 12.1% 23.4%
Silver 65.0% 34.8% 41.1% 50.1% 51.9% 63.3%
Gold + Platinum 1.8% 21.7% 2.8% 7.6% 36.0% 13.3%
Count 163 207 107 341 347 128
Drug Cost Up to $2250 per year More than $2250 per year
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 29.5% 33.5% 45.5% 9.6% 10.6% 28.6%
Silver 66.5% 41.2% 46.6% 77.5% 57.0% 57.1%
Gold + Platinum 3.9% 25.3% 8.0% 12.9% 32.4% 14.3%
Count 281 233 88 178 142 42
SRHS SRHS Good, Very Good, or
Excellent
SRHS Poor or Fair
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 23.6% 25.1% 37.2% 15.5% 19.5% 43.6%
Silver 70.2% 45.3% 54.1% 72.8% 46.1% 48.7%
Gold + Platinum 6.2% 29.6% 8.7% 11.7% 34.4% 7.7%
Count 356 426 196 103 128 39
Income/Education Low Income and Education Other
2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2009
None 16.8% 28.4% 54.2% 23.1% 23.0% 36.5%
Silver 76.8% 38.6% 41.7% 69.2% 46.8% 54.5%
Gold + Platinum 6.3% 33.0% 4.2% 7.7% 30.3% 9.0%
Count 95 88 24 364 466 211-41-
Table 3 : Classification of yearly drug bill
Bill class Share Average bill
bill = $0 6.9% $0
$0 < bill # $250 4.3% $116
$250 < bill # $1000 9.9% $647
$1000 < bill # $1500 9.0% $1,236
$1500 < bill # $2250 15.2% $1,888
$2250 < bill # $3000 14.0% $2,597
$3000 < bill # $4000 16.3% $3,471
$4000 < bill # $5100 8.2% $4,476
$5100 < bill # $7000 8.4% $5,925
$7000 < bill # $10000 5.3% $8,256
$10000 < bill # $20000 2.4% $12,327
bill > $20000 0.1% $29,282
Source : MCBS-42-
Table 4: Parameter estimates for the model of health dynamics
  Males Females
Mortality:
Non-white 0.309* (0.127) -0.083 (0.117)
High education -0.734** (0.094) -0.706** (0.089)
Latent frailty γ  1.336** (0.061) 1.728** (0.057)
Drug bill:
Non-white -0.271 (0.301) -0.683** (0.246)
High education -1.133** (0.209) -1.232** (0.185)
Latent frailty γ 6.124** (0.175) 6.228** (0.150)
SRHS:
Non-white 0.370** (0.065) 0.465** (0.052)
High education -0.914** (0.044) -0.847** (0.039)
Latent frailty γ 0.877** (0.025) 0.910** (0.022)
Latent frailty
Serial correlation ρ  0.967**  (0.0001)   0.963** (0.001)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses All equations also include age splines.  SRHS is
coded 1 for Excellent to 5 for Poor.  Parameters significantly different from zero are
marked ** if p<.01, * if p<.05.-43-
Figure 1.  Out-of-Pocket Costs for Part D Insurance Contracts
Figure 2: Simulation results with only the Standard Plan: Enrollment shares-44-
Figure 3: Simulation results with only the Standard Plan: Adverse selection
Figure 4: Simulation results with only the Standard Plan: Profits with actual subsidies-45-
Figure 5: Simulation results with only the Standard Plan: Profits with different subsidies
Figure 6: Simulation results with two plan types: Enrollment-46-
Figure 7: Simulation results with two plan types: Enrollees’ avg. drug bill 
Figure 8: Simulation results with two plan types: Profits and risk adjustment-47-
Figure 9.   Simulation results with only the Platinum Plan: Enrollment shares
Figure 10.  Simulation results with only the Platinum Plan: Adverse selection-48-
Figure 11.  Simulation results with only the Platinum Plan: Profits with different subsidies